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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between the Great Moderation and two measures of 
inﬂation performance: trend inﬂation and inﬂation volatility. Using annual data from 1970 to 
2011 for a large panel of 180 developed and developing economies, the results show that, as 
expected, both measures are positively correlated with output volatility. When the two measures 
are jointly considered, however, and there is sufﬁcient information to identify their effects 
separately, our empirical ﬁndings show that the effect of inﬂation volatility is positive, while the 
effect of trend inﬂation is negative. The implication is that reduced inﬂation volatility (holding 
trend inﬂation constant) helps stabilize the business cycle, whereas lower inﬂation (holding 
inﬂation volatility constant) exacerbates output volatility.
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1.   Introduction
  One of the most notable macroeconomic developments of the last few decades has 
been the Great Moderation: the apparent decline in output volatility that has characterized 
the business cycle of the US and other countries. Because of its obvious importance for 
macroeconomic theory and policy, the Great Moderation has been extensively scrutinized 
by both theoretical and empirical research1.
  While numerous factors have been proposed as possible explanations for this
1 The term “great moderation” originated in Stock and Watson (2002). See Summers (2005), Gali 
and Gambetti (2009), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), and Carvalho and Gabaix (2013) for 
other recent examples. Keating (2012) provides an interesting longer-term perspective. Vesselinov 
(2012) and Gozgor (2013) provide two interesting country-speciﬁc studies of the business cycle 
and its relation to inﬂation.
* Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago, 601 S. Morgan St., Chicago, IL 
60607-7121; gkarras@uic.edu. I wish to thank two anonymous referees and the editor of this 
journal for helpful comments and suggestions.  All errors and omissions remain mine.8 
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widespread smoothing of the business cycle2, our focus here is the link between the 
Great Moderation and inﬂation performance across countries and over time. Beginning 
with Blanchard and Simon (2001), a more stable inﬂation environment is one of the main 
explanations that have been advanced for the Great Moderation. The literature however is 
divided on whether this means lower inﬂation volatility, as found by Blanchard and Simon 
(2001), or lower trend inﬂation, as argued by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008).
  The goal of the present paper is to shed light on this debate, disentangling the effects 
of inﬂation volatility from those of trend inﬂation. This is less than straightforward because 
of the very high positive correlation between these two inﬂation variables in most data sets: 
periods of high trend inﬂation tend to coincide with periods of high inﬂation volatility, so 
that separate identiﬁcation of their effects on the business cycle is not always possible.
  Our approach manages to achieve this using a panel methodology that analyzes 
annual data from 1970 to 2011 for 180 developed and developing economies. To our 
knowledge, this is the most extensive data set used for this purpose, and, as it turns out, 
it sufﬁces to establish the following conclusions. As expected, both trend inﬂation and 
inﬂation volatility are positively correlated with output volatility in bivariate relations. 
When both are included in the regression, however, our empirical ﬁndings show that the 
effect of inﬂation volatility is positive, while the effect of trend inﬂation is negative. The 
implication is that reduced inﬂation volatility (holding trend inﬂation constant) helps 
stabilize the business cycle, whereas lower inﬂation (holding inﬂation volatility constant) 
exacerbates output volatility. These results are robust to a couple of different deﬁnitions of 
output volatility and a number of different estimation techniques.
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the sources of the 
data and deﬁnes the variables to be used in the estimation. Section 3 outlines the estimation 
methodology, derives the main empirical results, and implements a number of robustness 
checks. Section 4 discusses the ﬁndings and concludes.
2.   The Data
  All data are obtained from the UN National Accounts and the data set consists of a 
panel of the 180 economies for which annual data exist for each of the years 1970-2011. 
Nominal aggregate income ( Y ) is measured by GDP in current prices, while real income 
( y ) is measured by GDP in constant (2005) prices. Both series are expressed in national 
currencies. The price level ( P ) is then deﬁned as the GDP deﬂator, P = Y / y, and inﬂation 
( π ) as the annual growth rate of the price level.
 Using  i to index over countries and t over time, we denote output volatility by  t i,  , 
trend inﬂ  ation by  t i,  , and inﬂ  ation volatility by 
  t i, . All three variables are constructed 
using rolling 5-year windows, so they are deﬁ  ned over 1975-2011.  t i,   and 
  t i,  are equal 
to the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the inﬂ  ation rate over each 5-year 
period.
2  These include a more stable economic structure, stabilizing monetary and/or ﬁscal policies, and 
less violent exogenous shocks (“good luck”). 9 
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  To quantify output volatility,  t i,  , two techniques are used. First, we compute 
the standard deviation of the real GDP growth rate, again calculated over rolling 5-year 
windows. We denote this simple measure by 
y
t i

,  . In addition, we decompose the real 
GDP series between the trend and a cyclical component, using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
ﬁlter, proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1980, 1997), and extensively used in the business-
cycle literature. Letting  ) ln( , , t i t i y x   denote (the log of) real GDP, the HP ﬁlter deﬁnes its 
trend,  t i x , , as the component that minimizes
 
    


 

    
1
2
1 , , , 1 ,
1
2
, ,
T
t
t i t i t i t i
T
t
t i t i x x x x x x 
for   > 0. In the empirical section below we report results for   = 100, the value suggested 
by Hodrick and Prescott for annual data, but we also tried   = 6.25, the smoothing 
parameter value recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data (with no 
appreciable difference in our ﬁndings). The cyclical output component is then simply given 
by  ,, it it xx  , and its standard deviation over the rolling 5-year windows,  ,
HP
it  , provides our 
second measure of business-cycle volatility.
  The Appendix provides a list of the 180 economies3. As the Appendix makes clear, 
the sample of countries is quite diverse, including economies which are at various stages of 
development, and have had very different growth and inﬂation experiences.
  Figure 1 plots the simple (unweighted) averages of our two measures of business-
cycle volatility,  ,
y
it
   and  ,
HP
it  , over all 180 economies. First, Figure 1 shows that the two 
measures move closely together, thus providing very similar information about the behavior 
of the underlying  t i,   (and accounting for the robustness of our empirical results in the 
next section)4.
  In addition, and more to our purpose here, Figure 1 clearly illustrates that the “Great 
Moderation” is a global phenomenon. Indeed, with two notable exceptions, both measures 
of cyclical output volatility have steadily declined over the last four decades (the two 
exceptions are 1988-1992 and the period following the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis).
  The next two Figures visualize the relationship between output volatility and 
inﬂation performance, using again simple averages over all 180 economies. The 
y
t i

,   
measure of output volatility is combined with trend inﬂation on Figure 2, and with inﬂation 
volatility on Figure 3. Both Figures paint a similar picture. Particularly since the mid-
1980s, output volatility is positively related with both trend inﬂation and inﬂation volatility, 
as expected: lower and more stable inﬂation has coincided with a smoother business cycle. 
Note however, that trend inﬂation and inﬂation volatility evolve so similarly that telling 
which of the two is more closely related to output volatility is far from easy. This will be 
the subject of the more formal empirical investigation of the next section.
3 As already noted, country selection has been dictated by data availability only.
4 For the entire panel data set,   ,, ,
yH P
it it corr
   = 0.88.10 
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3.   Empirical Evidence
3.1   Trend  Inﬂation
  We start with a simple relationship between output volatility and trend inﬂation. 
Using Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2008) empirical speciﬁcation, the estimated model 
is:
  t i t i t i t i u v w , , ,         , (1)
where  t i,   is output volatility;  t i,   trend inﬂation; i is indexing over countries and t 
over time; w and v represent country- and time-speciﬁc effects; and  , a parameter to be 
estimated, captures the effect of trend inﬂation on output volatility.
  Table 1 presents the results. Panel A includes all observations, and the estimated  ’s 
are found to be positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant. They are also robust to whether 
the regression includes ﬁxed or random effects, and to whether  t i,   is proxied by  ,
y
it
   or 
,
HP
it  . However, they are quite small, questioning the economic signiﬁcance of the effects. 
This small size, however, could be the result of a relatively small number of extremely high 
inﬂation values that ﬂatten the regression line.
  To check this, Panel B of Table 1 repeats the exercise excluding inﬂation values 
higher than 100%5. The estimated  ’s remain positive, highly statistically signiﬁcant, 
and robust to the various speciﬁcations, but they also become much larger, indicating 
economically signiﬁcant effects. Panel C pursues this further, excluding inﬂation values 
higher than 30%6. The estimated  ’s are once again positive, highly statistically signiﬁcant, 
and robust, while now they become even more sizable. These results therefore suggest that 
the effect of trend inﬂation on business-cycle volatility is positive and signiﬁcant.
3.2 Inﬂation Volatility
  Next, we move to the relationship between output volatility and inﬂation volatility. 
The estimated model becomes:
  t i t i t i t i u v w , , ,     
    , (2)
where 
  t i,  is inﬂation volatility, and  , a parameter to be estimated, captures the effect of 
inﬂation volatility on output volatility.
  Table 2 presents the results of estimating model (2). Panel A starts by including all 
observations, showing that the estimated  ’s are positive, highly statistically signiﬁcant, 
and robust to the two different measures of  t i,   and to whether ﬁxed or random effects are 
5 This reduces the sample size from 6660 to 6485 observations, or by 2.6%.
6 This further reduces the sample size to 6081 observations, or by 8.7% of the original size.11 
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included. Like the estimated  ’s of Table 1, however, the point estimates of these  ’s are 
very small, casting doubt on the economic signiﬁcance of their effects. It turns out again, 
however, that this is because of the small number of observations with very large inﬂation 
values that ﬂatten the regression line.
 To  conﬁrm this, the next two panels of Table 2 repeat the estimation of model (2), 
excluding inﬂation values higher than 100% (Panel B) or higher than 30% (Panel C), 
following the strategy of Table 1. It is apparent that the estimated  ’s are still positive, 
highly statistically signiﬁcant, and robust to the various speciﬁcations, but in addition 
they increase substantially in size indicating effects that are much more economically 
signiﬁcant. These results therefore suggest that the effect of inﬂation volatility on business-
cycle volatility is positive and signiﬁcant.
3.3 Trend  Inﬂation v Inﬂation Volatility
 Our  ﬁndings so far show that output volatility ( t i,  ) is positively correlated with both 
trend inﬂation ( t i,  ) and inﬂation volatility (
  t i, ). If  t i,   and 
  t i,  are highly correlated 
themselves, however, these ﬁndings would not necessarily mean that both variables have 
an independent effect on the business cycle. And, as expected, the correlations between 
t i,   and 
  t i,  are rather high: 0.96 for the full sample (Panels A in the Tables), 0.75 for the 
sample excluding trend inﬂation greater than 100% (Panels B), and 0.50 for the sample 
excluding trend inﬂation greater than 30% (Panels C). Such high correlations mean that, 
even if only one of the two inﬂation variables economically mattered for cyclical variability, 
both would appear to be correlated with  t i,   in the bivariate regressions of models (1) and 
(2).
  To address this issue and determine which of the two inﬂation variables matters the 
most, we now estimate the nested model:
  t i t i t i t i t i u v w , , , ,       
      , (3)
where notation is as before, with the following difference in interpretation:   now captures 
the effect of trend inﬂation on output volatility, holding inﬂation volatility constant; while 
  represents the effect of inﬂation volatility on output volatility, holding trend inﬂation 
constant7.
  The results are presented in Table 3, which is organized like the last two Tables. 
Begin with Panel A which includes all observations. The estimated  ’s are all positive, 
while the estimated  s are all negative. We note however that all coefﬁcients are very 
small in magnitude and largely statistically insigniﬁcant, across the different speciﬁcations. 
This may not be very helpful, but it is easily explained given the extremely high correlation 
(0.96) between  t i,   and 
  t i, , which apparently leaves very little independent information 
to be used in the identiﬁcation of   and   in the multivariable framework of model (3).
7  This is similar to the model used by Blanchard and Simon (2001).12 
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  Panel B of Table 3 estimates the model excluding trend inﬂation values higher than 
100%. The picture now changes drastically. Both estimated  s and  s are substantially 
larger (in absolute value) and all are highly statistically signiﬁcant. It is obvious that 
the reduced, though still high, correlation between  t i,   and 
  t i,  in this sample (0.75) 
allows for enough independent variability to identify their separate effects more precisely. 
Interestingly, the estimated  s are all positive (as expected), while the estimated  s are 
all negative (the “wrong” sign)8. The implication is that reduced inﬂation volatility (holding 
trend inﬂation constant) helps stabilize the business cycle, whereas lower inﬂation (holding 
inﬂation volatility constant) exacerbates output volatility.
  Panel C of Table 3 estimates model (3), excluding inﬂation values higher than 30%. 
Estimated coefﬁcients are generally greater (in absolute value), but the signs and statistical 
signiﬁcance remain the same with Panel B. In particular, the estimated  s are positive 
while the estimated  s are negative. Once more the results suggest that the effect of 
inﬂation volatility on output volatility is positive when trend inﬂation is controlled for; 
whereas the effect of trend inﬂation on output volatility is negative when inﬂation volatility 
is controlled for. This is consistent with Blanchard and Simon’s (2001) ﬁnding that it is the 
lower inﬂation volatility (rather than lower trend inﬂation) that has mattered more for the 
reduction in output volatility.
4.   Discussion and Conclusions
  This paper investigated the relationship between the Great Moderation and two 
measures of inﬂation performance: trend inﬂation and inﬂation volatility. Using annual 
data from 1970 to 2011 for a large panel of 180 developed and developing economies, 
the results show that, as expected, both measures are positively correlated with output 
volatility.
  When both measures are included in the regression, however, and there is sufﬁcient 
information to identify their effects separately, our empirical ﬁndings show that the effect of 
inﬂation volatility is positive, while the effect of trend inﬂation is negative. The implication 
is that reduced inﬂation volatility (holding trend inﬂation constant) helps stabilize the 
business cycle, whereas lower inﬂation (holding inﬂation volatility constant) exacerbates 
output volatility. These results are found to be robust to a number of different empirical 
speciﬁcations and estimation techniques.
 These  ﬁndings have obvious policy implications. The most obvious is that inﬂation 
volatility, rather than trend inﬂation, matters the most for the severity of the business 
cycle. It follows that it has been reduced inﬂation volatility, rather than reductions in trend 
inﬂation, that contributed the most to the Great Moderation, as argued by Blanchard and 
Simon (2001).
  Even more strongly, our estimates suggest that, holding inﬂation volatility constant, 
8  Interestingly, these are the same with the signs obtained by Blanchard and Simon (2001), though 
in a much smaller panel data set.13 
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reducing trend inﬂation ends up deteriorating the business cycle. The robustness of this 
somewhat unexpected result should be the subject of further research, but if conﬁrmed 
by additional evidence this ﬁnding may help resolve the apparent paradox of the output 
volatility reversal of the post-2008 period in an environment of very low inﬂation.
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Table 1
Estimated Model:  t i t i t i t i u v w , , ,        
PANEL A: Full Sample
,,
y
it it
     ,,
HP
it it  
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
   0.0006** 0.0006**  0.0007**  7.4·10-6**  5.2·10-6**  5.4·10-6**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (2.0·10-6) (1.8·10-6) (1.8·10-6)
PANEL B: Sample with  , 100% it 
,,
y
it it
     ,,
HP
it it  
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
   0.0333**    0.3421**  0.0360** 3.3·10-4**  3.2·10-4**  3.4·10-4**
(0.0040)   (0.0043) (0.0042) (3.6·10-5) (3.9·10-5) (3.7·10-5)
PANEL C: Sample with  , 30% it 
,,
y
it it
     ,,
HP
it it  
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
   0.0673**    0.0757**  0.0837** 0.0333**  0.0006**  0.0006**
(0.0087)   (0.0099) (0.0094) (7.8·10-5) (8.7·10-5) (8.3·10-5)
Notes: Business-cycle volatility,  t i,  , is measured by  ,
y
it
  , the standard deviation of real GDP 
growth, or  ,
HP
it  , the standard deviation of the Hodrick-Prescott detrended (log) real GDP;  t i,   
is trend inﬂation;  i w  and  t v  represent ﬁxed (“FE”) or random (“RE”) country and time effects 
(not reported). “OLS” replaces  i w  and  t v  by a simple constant term (also not reported). Usable 
observations are 6660 for Panel A, 6485 for Panel B, and 6081 for Panel C. Estimated standard 
errors in parentheses. ** and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% signiﬁcance levels.15 
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Table 2
Estimated Model:  ,, , it i t it it wv u    
  
PANEL A: Full Sample
,,
y
it it
     ,,
HP
it it  
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
   0.0003**    0.0003**  0.0003**  3.7·10-6**  2.7·10-6**  2.8·10-6**
(0.0001)   (0.0001) (0.0001) (1.2·10-6) (1.0·10-6) (1.0·10-6)
PANEL B: Sample with  , 100% it 
,,
y
it it
     ,,
HP
it it  
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
   0.1018**    0.0701**  0.0736**  9.3·10-4**  6.3·10-4**  6.6·10-4**
(0.0044)   (0.0044) (0.0043) (4.0·10-5) (4.0·10-5) (3.9·10-5)
PANEL C: Sample with  , 30% it 
,,
y
it it
     ,,
HP
it it  
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
   0.2665**    0.1983**  0.2090**   0.0021**  0.0014**  0.0015**
(0.0084)   (0.0092) (0.0089) (7.6·10-5) (8.3·10-5) (8.0·10-5)
Notes:  See Table 1.   , it
   is the standard deviation of inﬂation.16 
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Table 3
Estimated Model:  ,, , , it i t it it it wv u      
    
PANEL A: Full Sample
,,
y
it it
     ,,
HP
it it  
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
   0.0017*    0.0012  0.0013   1.8·10-5*  9.1·10-6  1.0·10-5
(0.0008)   (0.0007) (0.0007) (7.5·10-6) (6.3·10-6) (6.3·10-6)
   –0.0007   –0.0003 –0.0004 –6.7·10-6 –2.4·10-6 –3.0·10-6
(0.0005)   (0.0007) (0.0004) (4.4·10-6) (3.7·10-6) (3.7·10-6)
PANEL B: Sample with  , 100% it 
,,
y
it it
     ,,
HP
it it  
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
   –0.0768** –0.0413** –0.0426** –6.3·10-4** –3.5·10-4** –3.5·10-4**
(0.0057)   (0.0065) (0.0063) (5.2·10-5) (5.9·10-5) (5.7·10-5)
   0.1675**   0.1027**  0.1075**  0.0015**  9.0·10-4**  9.4·10-4**
(0.0066)   (0.0067) (0.0066) (5.9·10-5) (6.1·10-5) (6.0·10-6)
PANEL C: Sample with  , 30% it 
,,
y
it it
     ,,
HP
it it  
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
   –0.0800**  –0.0419** –0.0391**  –0.0006** –0.0002* –0.0002*
(0.0093)   (0.0112) (0.0106)  (8.5·10-5) (0.0001) (9.5·10-5)
   0.3074**    0.2192**  0.2282**  0.0024**  0.0015**  0.0016**
(0.0096)   (0.0108) (0.0105) (8.7·10-5) (9.6·10-5) (9.4·10-5)
Notes:  See Tables 1 and 2.17 
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Figure 1
Two measures of Real GDP Volatility
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Figure 2
Real GDP Growth Volatility and Trend Inﬂ  ation
Unweighted Averages of 180 Economies: 1975-2011
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Figure 3
Real GDP Growth Volatility and Inﬂ  ation Volatility
Unweighted Averages of 180 Economies: 1975-2011
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Appendix
List of the 180 Economies
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, 
Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Brunei 
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape 
Verde, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China: People's Republic 
of, China: Hong Kong SAR, China: Macao SAR, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook 
Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, French Polynesia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran: Islamic Republic of, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Oman, 
Pakistan, 
Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto 
Rico, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South 
Africa, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, 
Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, 
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
United Republic of Tanzania: Mainland, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 